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Abstract
A client wishes to outsource computation on confidential
data to a network of parties. He does not trust a single
party but believes that multiple parties do not collude. To
solve this problem, we use the idea of treating one of the
parties as a helper. A helper assists computation only.
Often using more parties ensures confidentiality despite
more corrupted parties. This does not hold for adding a
helper. But a helper can in some cases lower the amount
of communication asymptotically to the theoretical mini-
mum of one bit per AND gate, improving significantly on
schemes without a helper. It can also allow for very ef-
ficient computations of certain functions, as we show for
the exponential function with public base.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing is on the rise with security remaining
as one of the key challenges. A cloud provider must be
fully trusted to refrain from misusing any confidential in-
formation. Often a single vulnerability, e.g. a corrupt sys-
tem administrator, can put the confidentiality of a large
amount of data at risk. Secure multi-party computation
(MPC) is a computationally efficient approach that allows
a client to outsource computation to a group of parties (or
cloud providers), assuring that the client’s information is
prevented from misuse even if some parties are corrupted
or cannot fully be trusted. Interaction is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, where a client uses various cloud providers and one
of them serves as a helper to facilitate computation. Ded-
icating one party for a special purpose, i.e. as a helper, is
in contrast to existing schemes [20, 5, 1, 4, 8, 9]. Typi-
cally shares of a secret are distributed equally among all
*This work extends the conference paper[27].
Figure 1: A client outsources computation believing that
no two cloud providers are dishonest. The right most
provider serves as helper.
parties, and all parties behave identically, i.e. they per-
form the same computations but on different values. It is
not clear, whether there is any benefit in deviating from
this well-established body of work. Thus, the question we
seek to answer is:
What are the advantages and disadvantages of using a
helper, i.e. one party for assisting computation?
To this end, we develop techniques for MPC computa-
tion using a helper and compare them to the state-of-the-
art in MPC focusing on the three party case. One might
conjecture that the use of a helper does not help in improv-
ing security, since it does not hold a share of a secret. This
is indeed one of our findings. One might also conjecture
that the minimum number of rounds for any non-trivial
operation is at least two, since the helper must receive in-
formation and return information. In fact, several of our
protocols match this (lower) bound. With respect to other
classical metrics such as communication and local com-
putation complexity, it seems harder to come up with rea-
sonable conjectures.
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Paper
Transmitted Bits for Rounds Maximum
AND of two single bits AND of all pairs of v variables Corrupted Parties
GMW ’87[20] >50 > 3 · v2 2 2
BMR ’90[5] >10 > 3 · v2 > 2 2
CCS ’16 [1] 3 3 · v(v− 1)/2 1 2
JOS (This work) 5 v(v− 1)/2+ 4v 2 1
Table 1: Comparison of three party protocols. XOR requires no communication in all schemes.
Our protocols using a helper are designed to minimize
communication and round complexity, while keeping lo-
cal computation complexity at the same level as the state-
of-the-art. However, we also present a method involving
a helper allowing to trade-off communication and round
complexity for logical operations, i.e. large fan-in AND
gates. Communication complexity has gained a lot in
importance lately. All modern schemes for data anal-
ysis, such as Hadoop or Spark, rely typically on data-
parallelism, i.e. performing the same computation for dif-
ferent parts of the data. Computation is done in a dis-
tributed fashion, which requires moving large amounts of
data between computers (as is needed for MPC, in partic-
ular for big data). The bottleneck becomes bandwidth, i.e.
the amount of information that can be transmitted, and not
network latency, i.e. number of communication rounds.
Since any Boolean circuit can be computed using basic
building blocks such as ‘AND’ and ‘XOR’ gates, most
MPC schemes focus on evaluating such circuits. There-
fore, a natural question is:
Howmany bits must be transmitted using a helper to eval-
uate AND and XOR gates with non-trivial security guar-
antees?
Intuitively, this seems to be at least two bits per (AND)
gate, since a helper must receive and transmit at least one
bit. However, surprisingly, in case the same variables
occur multiple times, we can reach the theoretical
minimum of just one bit per gate as indicated in Table 1
with non-trivial security guarantees under the commonly
found assumption that randomness is pre-shared among
parties. This is almost a factor 3 less than prior work
for three party computation. Unfortunately, this comes
at a price that anyone striving for performance might
well be willing to pay. Traditionally, the entire system
is corrupted if any confidential information becomes
available to any party. Honest, non-corrupted parties are
(implicitly) also assumed to abuse confidential informa-
tion. We assume that the system is only compromised if a
corrupted party, i.e. the attacker, gets secret information,
but honest, non-corrupted parties participating in the
computation would not abuse confidential information.
Essentially, this means that an attacker can only corrupt
one party in our scheme but two in other schemes as
indicated in the last column of Table 1. Arguably the
largest benefits of using a helper can be reaped when
computing special functions such as the exponential
function in this work, where mathematical laws involving
two variables can be used to compute the function in just
two rounds.
To summarize, a helper can imply a significant reduc-
tion of communication complexity in several situations
under the condition that the system is only compromised
if a corrupted party, i.e. the attacker, gets secret informa-
tion.
• If the same variables occur in multiple operations so
that the effort of sharing with the helper can be re-
duced.
• If the function to be computed allows leveraging the
secret sharing principle of having encrypted values
and keys.
1.1 Contributions
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We elaborate on the “distrust attacker” model assum-
ing semi-honest parties and provide a mapping of se-
curity guarantees to the standard “distrust all” secu-
rity model.
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• We assess the usefulness of a helper assisting com-
putation. We present a new scheme for MPC in the
semi-honest model for boolean gates using three par-
ties with non-trivial security guarantees. If variables
occur multiple times, we improve on the amount of
communication needed to compute multiple ANDs
compared to prior work (see Table 1 and Related
Work Section). We even reach an asymptotically op-
timal value of just one bit per AND gate if the num-
ber of evaluated AND gates is more than linear in the
number of variables.
• We present a method to compute unbounded fan-in
gates in constant rounds. It comes with a trade-off
for communication and rounds. Using w variables
and messages of size O(w · 2w−k) for arbitrary k ∈
[2,w] an AND can be computed in O(logk) rounds
and O(w ·2w−k) operations involving single bits.
• We present a statistically secure protocol for comput-
ing any exponential function ax for a secret exponent
x and public base a improving prior work (even in
the same model) considerably.
1.2 Outline
After stating the model in Section 2, we provide an
overview of the method and its motivation in Section 3,
followed by describing the secret sharing in Section 4
and basic operations in Section 5, i.e. XOR and NOT.
The basic ideas of the AND protocol are stated in Sec-
tion 6 using four parties, i.e. two helpers. The number of
helpers is reduced to one in Section 7. In Section 7.1 we
derive a protocol that achieves amortized communication
of just 1 bit per AND gate, if the same variables occur in
a large number of gates. A trade-off between communi-
cation and round complexity for arbitrary fan-in gates is
given in Section 7.3. A protocol for computing exponen-
tial functions with a public base is given in Section 7.2.
2 Model
We adopt the semi-honest model for client-server compu-
tation, where a curious but passive attacker can monitor a
party completely, e.g. its memory, disc and CPU registers.
A client holds an arbitrary amount of secret values. The
client wishes to evaluate a function using three parties,
such that no corrupted party, i.e., attacker, can learn any-
thing about the input or the output. The standard model is
different since it is based on distrusting everybody. This
means that no party should learn anything about the input.
The standard, i.e. “distrust all”, model assumes that hon-
est, non-corrupted parties do not actively share any infor-
mation with any other party throughout computation but
can still not be trusted with any confidential information,
i.e.,. they behave dishonestly as soon as they get secrets.
In our model, an honest party would not misuse secret in-
formation, but an attacker would. We call this “distrust
attacker” model. Any result for a “distrust all” model can
be directly translated to the “distrust attacker” model:
Theorem 1. An MPC scheme remains confidentiality of
secrets despite x corrupted parties for a “distrust all”
model, if and only if it remains confidentiality despite x+1
corrupted parties in the “distrust attacker” model.
Proof. Assume that corrupted parties share their infor-
mation with all parties. Assume that for a set of x+ 1
corrupted parties S in the distrust all model, at least one
party A (not necessarily corrupted) can obtain some con-
fidential information using the information from the par-
ties S. Therefore, in the distrust attacker model, assume
that S∪{A} are corrupted. In this case, all corrupted par-
ties, i.e., also the attacker, obtain all information from the
S∪ {A} parties and, thus, also confidential information.
Therefore, if anMPC schemeswithstands x corrupted par-
ties in the distrust all model it cannot withstand more than
x+ 1 parties in the distrust attacker model.
Assume that for x+2 corrupted parties S in the distrust at-
tacker model, at least one corrupted party A∈ S can obtain
some confidential information. Therefore, in the distrust
all model, assume that S \A are corrupted. Since A re-
ceives by assumption all information from parties S \A it
obtains confidential information.
In all MPC schemes, typically, a client encrypts its se-
crets and distributes the shares among the parties, the par-
ties compute the desired function and return their shares to
the client. The client itself does not participate in the com-
putation and, therefore, does not count as a party. This
differs from the classical MPC model, where each party
holds a secret (or at least a share), and the output should be
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known by (at least) one party. We can emulate the classi-
cal model: The parties can always obtain the secret value
of an output through collusion (rather than transmitting all
their shares to the client). In case each party has a secret,
each party can execute the same protocol for encryption
and distribution of shares of its secret as a client having all
secrets. Thus, the extension to using several clients (each
having some secret value) is obvious.
Our simplest network consists of a client, a key holder
(KH) and an encrypted value holder (EVH) and a helper.
The client communicates with the KH and EVH. A net-
work with three parties is shown in Figure 1. We as-
sume perfectly secure communication channels between
parties. We assume that there is pre-shared randomness
among pairs of parties. This implies that keys do not have
to be transmitted but can be regareded as pre-shared. In
practice, one can generate keys using a shared secret seed
and pseudo-random number generators.
3 Overview of Approach
Our scheme called JOS requires at least three parties,
where each party can be thought of having a dedicated
role: a keyholder (KH), an encrypted value holder
(EVH) and a helper. Beyond three parties, the number
of keyholders increases. Generally, the keyholder stores
keys but it has no access to ciphertexts. The encrypted
value holder stores encrypted values but no keys. Note,
there are circumstances, where this distinction has to
be seen less strict, e.g., there might be two encryptions
of the same secret such that one is held by the KH. A
helper assists computations. It might obtain keys and
encrypted values that do not match, i.e. none of its keys
can be used to decrypt any of its encrypted values. The
helper should only facilitate computation, which is a key
conceptual feature of our method. For example, assume
the parties should store a large amount of data. Since all
other methods require shares (of at least the same size
as ours) being held by all parties, each party must store
its shares somewhere, whereas in our case only the EVH
and the KH need to store data. Thus, we improve on the
amount of storage needed for three party protocols and
match those of two party protocols.
The (mathematical) motivation to use helpers is that
the AND of two numbers can be computed by combining
four parts consisting only of encrypted values and keys.
In a naive computation, each part can be computed by
one party, encrypted and combined by the KH and EVH
to yield an encrypted AND of the two numbers. This
would yield a total of four parties including two helpers.
Through double encryption of values, we can reduce the
number of parties to three. The derivation of the protocols
uses the associative and distributive properties of linear
secret sharing. Our scheme is illustrated for three encryp-
tion schemes based on XOR and addition. The given pro-
tocols perform efficient Boolean operations (AND, XOR)
operations. They could also be extended to arithmetic op-
erations (addition, multiplication). Linear secret sharing
strikes through little computational overhead – in particu-
lar when compared to protocols that require cryptographic
primitives, e.g. generation of prime numbers.
4 Encryption
We use linear secret sharing, but only two out of three
parties obtain a share, i.e. in most situations we generate
only two shares. We label these shares differently, i.e.
we have one encrypted value and, potentially, multiple
keys. The distinction between keys and encrypted values
is sometimes helpful, e.g. for computing an exponential
function (Section 7.2). For a given bit m ∈ {0,1}
we choose a random key K ∈ {0,1}. The encryption
ENCK(m) of bit m ∈ {0,1} using key K is the XOR
(⊕ symbol), i.e. ENCK(m) := K ⊕m. The decryption
DECK(c) of a ciphertext c is DECK(c) := c⊕K.
5 XOR and NOT Operations
We discuss the entire process ranging from encryption of
plaintexts to decryption of results for a single operation.
To compute a (bitwise) XOR of two numbers a,b the
client encrypts both a and b. It sends the two keys to
the KH and the encrypted values to the EVH. As a next
step, the KH computes the XOR of the two keys and the
EVH the XOR of the two encrypted values. Both send
their results back to the client. The client obtains a⊕b by
decrypting the result from the EVH with the key received
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from the KH.
A NOT operation (denoted by ¬) corresponds to com-
puting an XOR of an expression and the constant one.
It can be done by the EVH by computing the ‘NOT’
of the encrypted value. More mathematically, we have
¬a = a⊕ 1 and ¬ENCKa (a) = ¬(a⊕Ka) = (¬a)⊕Ka =
ENCKa(¬a).
6 Basic Ideas for an AND Gate
To illustrate the main ideas, we discuss the AND gate for
two numbers using two helpers aside from the EVH and
the KH. Later, we refine the algorithms to require only
one helper, i.e. three parties, and extend this to multiple
parties. Note, all our main results are based on the three
party protocols using one helper. The protocol could be
extended to multiplication working in an analogous man-
ner. The key idea is to express the AND of the plaintexts
using several parts, each consisting of an encrypted value
and a key. Each part can be computed on a separate party,
e.g. we use (and prove) that
a∧b=
(
ENCKa(a)∧ENCKb(b)
)
⊕ (Ka∧Kb)
⊕
(
Ka∧ENCKb(b)
)
⊕
(
Kb∧ENCKa(a)
)
(1)
Each of the four terms ENCKa(a) ∧ ENCKb(b), Ka ∧
ENCKb(b), Kb ∧ENCKa(a) and Ka ∧Kb is computed by
one party. Each of the two helpers chooses a key to en-
crypt its part before sharing the encrypted part with the
EVH and the key with the KH. The KH and EVH combine
all partial results to obtain the key and encrypted value of
a∧ b. The algorithm to compute the AND of two bits is
shown in Figure 2. In Steps 1 to 3, the client prepares
the computation. Step 4 can also be seen as part of the
preparation, i.e. secret sharing. The actual computation
of the AND consists only of steps 5-9. No keys must
be transmitted during computation if keys are pre-shared
or randomness is created using a shared secret seed and
pseudo-random number generators (as we stated in the
Model Section).
Next, we prove that the protocol is secure and correct.
Security can also be shown - it follows since no party can
reveal any information about a secret by any combination
of the values it has obtained. We prove it formally only
for our best protocols, e.g. for the three party protocol in
Section 7.
Theorem 2. The AND protocol in Figure 2 is correct.
Proof. To show correctness, i.e. that we indeed compute
a∧b, we must prove that the decryption done by the client
yields the correct result. From Figure 2 we see that the fi-
nal key delivered to the client is K f := t3⊕K3⊕K4. Thus,
it remains to show that for the EVH holds the claimed
equation in Step 9:
ENCK f (a∧b) = ENCt3⊕K3⊕K4(a∧b)
= t0⊕ENCK3(t1)⊕ENCK4(t2) (2)
We prove Equation (1) first. It can be derived using
basic laws such as distributiveness and associativeness,
x⊕ x= 0 and x⊕ 0= x and, thus, a⊕ x⊕ x= a:
a∧b=(a⊕Ka⊕Ka)∧b
=
(
(a⊕Ka)∧b
)
⊕
(
Ka∧b
)
=
(
(a⊕Ka)∧ (b⊕Kb⊕Kb)
)
⊕
(
Ka∧ (b⊕Kb⊕Kb)
)
=
(
(a⊕Ka)∧ (b⊕Kb)
)
⊕
(
(a⊕Ka)∧Kb
)
⊕
(
Ka∧ (b⊕Kb)
)
⊕
(
Ka∧Kb
)
(3)
Note, by using the definition of the encryption
ENCK(m) = m⊕ K we obtain Equation (1) from (3).
Next, we prove the Equation (2) starting from ENCK f (a∧
b) substituting the final key K f := t3⊕K3⊕K4:
ENCK f (a∧b)
=ENCt3⊕K3⊕K4(a∧b) ( Step 9, KH, Figure 2)
=(a∧b)⊕ (t3⊕K3⊕K4)
=(a∧b)⊕ (Ka ∧Kb)⊕K3⊕K4 (Using t3 := Ka ∧Kb)
=
(
(a⊕Ka)∧ (b⊕Kb)
)
⊕
(
Ka∧ (b⊕Kb)
)
⊕
(
Kb ∧ (a⊕Ka)
)
⊕ (Ka ∧Kb)⊕ (Ka ∧Kb)
⊕K3⊕K4 (Using Eq. (3))
=
(
(a⊕Ka)∧ (b⊕Kb)
)
⊕
(
Ka∧ (b⊕Kb)
)
⊕K4
⊕
(
Kb ∧ (a⊕Ka)
)
⊕K3 (Using a⊕ (x⊕x) = a)
=
(
ENCKa (a)∧ENCKb (b)
)
⊕ENCK4 (Ka ∧ENCKb (b))
⊕ENCK3 (ENCKa(a)∧Kb) (Using ENCK(m) := m⊕K)
=t0⊕ENCK3 (t1)⊕ENCK4 (t2)
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Client
Encrypted 
value holder
Keyholder
0) Given a,b; f(a,b) := a ˄ b = ?
1) Choose keys Ka,Kb 
2) ENCKa(a) = a ⊕ Ka
    ENCKb(b) = b ⊕ Kb
11) f(a,b) = DECKf(ENCKf(a˄b)) = a˄b
5) t0 := ENCKa(a) ˄ ENCKb(b)
9) ENCKf(a˄b)  = t0 ⊕ ENCK3(t1) ⊕  ENCK4(t2)  
Helper 1 Helper 25) t1 := ENCKa(a) ˄ Kb
6) Choose random K3
7) ENCK3(t1) = t1 ⊕ K3
4) Ka
8) K4
4) ENCKa(a)
8) ENCK3(t1)
5) t2 := Ka ˄ ENCKb(b)
6) Choose random K4
7) ENCK4(t2) = t2 ⊕ K4 
5) t3 := Ka ˄ Kb
9) Kf = t3 ⊕ K3 ⊕ K4 
4) ENCKb(b)
8) ENCK4(t2)
4) Kb
8) K3
3) ENCKa(a), ENCKb(b)
10) ENCKf(a˄b)
3) Ka, Kb
10) Kf
Figure 2: For comprehension purposes: Algorithm for an AND (∧) of two bits using two helpers. Later protocols use
one helper only.
Client
Encrypted 
value 
holder
Keyholder
0) Given a,b; f(a,b) := a ˄ b = ?
1) Choose keys Ka,Kb 
2) ENCKa(a) = a⊕Ka
    ENCKb(b) = b⊕Kb
13) f(a,b) = DECKf(ENCKfa˄b)) = a˄b
3) Choose random K2
4) ENCKb⊕K2(b) = ENCKb(b) ⊕ K2
6) t0 := ENCKa(a) ˄ ENCKb⊕K2(b)
10) ENCKf (a˄b) = t0 ⊕ ENCK7(p7) ⊕ (K5 ˄ K6) ⊕ K8
Helper 3) Choose random K5,K7
6) ENCK5(Kb⊕K2) = Kb ⊕ K2 ⊕ K5 
7) t1 := ENCKa(a) ˄ (Kb ⊕ K2)
8) ENCK7(p7) = t1 ⊕  (ENCK6(Ka) ˄ (Kb⊕K2))  ⊕ K7
5) ENCKa(a),K2
9) ENCK7(p7),K5
3) Choose random K6, K8
4) ENCK6(Ka) = Ka ⊕ K6
6) t2 := Ka ˄ ENCKb⊕K2(b)
10) t3 := K6 ˄ ENCK5(Kb ⊕ K2)    
11) Kf = t2 ⊕ t3 ⊕ K7 ⊕ K8
5) ENCKb⊕K2(b)
8) K6
5) Kb, ENCK6(Ka)
9) ENCK5(Kb⊕K2), K7
3) ENCKa(a), ENCKb(b)
11) ENCKf(a˄b)
3) Ka,Kb
12) Kf
Figure 3: Algorithm for an AND (∧) operation of two bits using three parties.
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7 Three Parties
Here, we reduce the number of parties from four to three
but still focus on the computation of a single ‘AND’. It is
possible to use only one helper, i.e., three parties. We re-
move Helper 2. For an AND of two secrets a,b encrypted
with Ka and Kb Helper 2 computes ENCKb(b)∧Ka (see
Figure 2). None of the other three parties can compute
this expression using both ENCKb(b) and Ka, since all
parties hold at least one of the two values Kb,ENCKa(a)
and therefore they could reveal a secret. However, the re-
maining helper (i.e. Helper 1) can compute on encrypted
values, i.e. the EVH can encrypt ENCKb(b) with a ran-
domly chosen keyK2 to obtain a ‘double’ encrypted value
of b, i.e. ENCKb⊕K2(b). The helper can use ENCKb⊕K2(b)
instead of ENCKb(b). In particular, the EVH can dou-
ble encrypt b and it can share ENCKb⊕K2(b) with the
KH (as long as the KH does not obtain K2) and the key
K2 with the helper. This allows the KH to compute
Ka ∧ ENCKb⊕K2(b), leaving to compute Ka ∧ (Kb⊕K2):
We encrypt both values, i.e. Ka with K6 and Kb⊕K2 with
K5 and compute using Equation (3):
Ka∧ (Kb⊕K2) = (4)
ENCK6(Ka)∧ENCK5(Kb⊕K2)⊕K5∧ENCK6(Ka)
⊕K6∧ENCK5(Kb⊕K2)⊕ (K5∧K6)
In this case, we do not need to distribute all four
terms to (four) different parties. In our scenario the
(remaining) helper holds Kb ⊕K2, K5 and ENCK6(Ka).
Thus, it can compute two terms, namely ENCK6(Ka)∧
ENCK5(Kb⊕K2) and K5∧ENCK6 (Ka). We can even sim-
plify for the helper: ENCK6(Ka)∧ENCK5 (Kb⊕K2)⊕K5∧
ENCK6(Ka) = ENCK6(Ka)∧ (Kb⊕K2).
This idea is realized in the protocol shown in Figure 3.
The message complexity can be reduced by pre-sharing of
keys. The very last key (K8) is only needed if the result is
used in further computations, e.g., we compute (a∧b)∧c
and reuse (a∧b).
Next, we show correctness and security of the AND
protocol.
Theorem 3. The AND protocol in Figure 3 is correct.
Proof. Analogously to the proof of Theorem 2, we show
that decrypting the encrypted result (Step 10 for the EVH)
with the final key (Step 11 for KH) in Figure 3 gives a∧b.
We start by transforming a∧b as shown below:
a∧b =
(
(a⊕Ka)∧ (b⊕ (Kb⊕K2))
)
⊕
(
(a⊕Ka)∧ (Kb⊕K2)
)
⊕
(
Ka ∧ (b⊕ (Kb⊕K2))
)
⊕
(
Ka∧ (Kb⊕K2)
)
(Using Eq. 3)
=
(
(a⊕Ka)∧ (b⊕ (Kb⊕K2))
)
⊕
(
(a⊕Ka)∧ (Kb⊕K2)
)
⊕
(
Ka ∧ (b⊕ (Kb⊕K2))
)
⊕ENCK6(Ka)∧ENCK5 (Kb⊕K2)⊕K5 ∧ENCK6 (Ka)
⊕K6 ∧ENCK5(Kb⊕K2)⊕ (K5 ∧K6) (Using Eq. 4)
=ENCKa(a)∧ENCKb⊕K2(b)(Using ENCK(m) = K⊕m)
⊕ENCKa(a)∧ (Kb⊕K2)⊕Ka ∧ENCKb⊕K2(b)
⊕ENCK6(Ka)∧ENCK5 (Kb⊕K2)
⊕K5 ∧ENCK6(Ka)⊕K6 ∧ENCK5 (Kb⊕K2)⊕ (K5 ∧K6)
=t0 (Using t0 := ENCKa(a)∧ENCKb⊕K2(b)
⊕ t1 (Using t1 := ENCKa(a)∧ (Kb⊕K2))
⊕ t2 (Using t2 := Ka ∧ENCKb⊕K2(b))
⊕ENCK6(Ka)∧ENCK5 (Kb⊕K2)
⊕K5 ∧ENCK6(Ka)⊕K6 ∧ENCK5 (Kb⊕K2)⊕ (K5 ∧K6)
=t0⊕ (K5 ∧K6)⊕ t1⊕K7⊕K7
⊕ENCK6(Ka)∧ENCK5 (Kb⊕K2)⊕K5 ∧ENCK6 (Ka)
⊕ t2⊕K6 ∧ENCK5(Kb⊕K2)
(Rearranging and XOR with K7⊕K7 = 0)
=t0⊕ (K5 ∧K6)⊕ t1⊕K7⊕K7⊕ENCK6 (Ka)∧ (Kb⊕K2)
⊕ t2⊕ t3 (Simplifying and t3 := K6∧ENCK5(Kb⊕K2))
=t0⊕ (K5 ∧K6)⊕ t1⊕ENCK6 (Ka)∧ (Kb⊕K2)⊕K7
⊕ t2⊕ t3⊕K7
=t0⊕ (K5 ∧K6)⊕ENCK7 (t4)⊕K7⊕
(
t2⊕ t3⊕K7
)
⊕K8⊕K8
(Using Def. of ENCK7(t4) in Step 8, Figure 3)
=t0⊕ (K5 ∧K6)⊕ENCK7 (t4)⊕K7⊕K8⊕K f
(Using K f = t2⊕ t3⊕K7⊕K8 in Step 10, Figure 3)
=ENCK f (a∧b)⊕K f = a∧b (Using Step 10, Figure 3)
Theorem 4. The AND protocol in Figure 2 is perfectly
secure.
Security follows since no party can reveal a secret by
arbitrary combination of the values it has.
Proof. We show that none of the parties can obtain any
information about a or b.
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The EVH obtains keys K2,K3,K5,K6,K8 and encrypted
values ENCKa(a),ENCKb(b),ENCK7(t7). To get infor-
mation about a or b the EVH needed to decrypt one
of the encrypted values, i.e. it needed Ka or Kb
or K7. However, it has no information about these
keys. The KH obtains Ka,Kb,K6,K7,K8,ENCK2⊕Kb(b) =
ENCK2(b ⊕ Kb),ENCK5(Kb ⊕ K2). The KH has nei-
ther K5 nor K2 so it cannot disclose any information
about a or b. The helper obtains Kb,K2,K5,K7 and
ENCKa(a),ENCK6(Ka). Since the helper has no informa-
tion about Ka and K6, it cannot learn anything about a or
b.
Theorem 5. The computation of the AND protocol (Steps
4-10) in Figure 2 needs a total of 5 transmitted bits.
Proof. In our model we assume that keys are pre-shared.
The distribution of the secrets by the client is not part
of the computation. Thus, only transmissions of en-
crypted values of Steps 5 to 9 are relevant, which
yields a total of five bits, i.e. ENCKa(a),ENCKb⊕K2(b),
ENCK6(Ka),ENCK7(t7) and ENCK5(Kb⊕K2).
7.1 Multiple ANDs: Reusing Variables and
Multiple Encryptions
We have shown that a single AND operation is perfectly
secure, underlying the assumption that no party has both
an encrypted value and a matching key. However, when
using the same variables in multiple operations (but in dif-
ferent pairings), the amortized communication per gate is
reduced, since the KH and EVH only need to share some
terms with the helper once. For example, to compute
a∧b, a∧ c the values related to a need to be shared only
once with the helper. In some cases, we might need two
different encryptions. The need for two encryptions arises
when evaluating circular structures, such as all three terms
a∧b, a∧c and b∧c. The encrypted values and keys can-
not be distributed such that the helper gets an encrypted
value without getting the corresponding key to decrypt it.
More precisely, to compute a∧b (see Figure 3), the helper
gets the key Kb, the encrypted key ENCK6(Ka) and the
encrypted value ENCKa(a). To compute a∧ c the helper
must get Kc and the encrypted value ENCKc(c), since it
already received ENCKa(a) and thus it cannot get key Ka.
To obtain b∧ c is not possible, since the helper has al-
ready Kb and Kc and thus cannot get either ENCKc(c) or
ENCKb(b).
To handle circular structures of the form above, two
encryptions of the same variable suffice. Multiple en-
cryptions of the same confidential variable can easily be
created by the KH and EVH. To re-encrypt a variable
a encrypted with key Ka. The KH chooses a key K
′
a
and transmits ENCK′a(Ka) to the EVH, which computes
ENCENC
K′a
(Ka)(ENCKa(a)) = ENCK′a(a). It is not hard to
see that for each variable out of v variables we need to
at most two encryptions to be able to compute any of the
O(v2) possible pairs. For an AND involving variable awe
use the first encryption of a, if a is on the left-hand side of
the AND, e.g. for a∧x, and the second encryption, if it is
on the right-hand side, e.g. x∧a.
Next, we discuss the adjusted protocols for the AND of
two variables a ∧ b using three parties reusing priorly
shared values with the helper. There are three cases:
Reusing both variables, reusing one variable, reusing one
variable and reencrypting the other. The protocol in Fig-
ure 4 shows the reuse of both operands of an AND. In this
case, compared to the protocol without reuse (Figure 3)
only two keys K′7 and K
′
8 need to be generated and shared
as well as the value ENCK′7
(t4).
Reusing values for one variable a, while transmitting
those of a variable b, works similarly. In the protocol in
Figure 3 two bits, ie. ENCKa(a) and ENCK6(Ka), do not
have to be transmitted. Reusing values for one variable a,
while reencrypting the other is shown in Figure 5. In this
case, we first reencrypt one variable, i.e. b, and then use
the reencrypted values. The KH sends ENCK′
b
(Kb) to the
KH. The EVH reencrypts b to get ENCK′
b
(b) and uses this
value in his computations. Note, that the KH can reuse
ENCK2⊕Kb(b) to get ENCK2⊕K′b
(b), i.e. the EVH and HE
keep K2 and the EVH does need to share ENCK′
b
⊕K2
(b) to
the HE. The same holds for ENCK5(Kb⊕K2).
Theorem 6. The protocols in Figure 4 and 5 are perfectly
secure and correct.
Proof. Correctness follows from correctness of Figure 3,
since all computations are identical. Security follows
from the fact that no party obtains additional information.
In the protocol of Figure 4 the helper obtains no input.
The EVH obtains an encrypted value that was encrypted
with a newly generated key K′7. The KH only obtains the
newly generated key K′7. In the protocol of Figure 5 the
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Encrypted 
value 
holder
Keyholder
Holds K2, K6,ENCKb⊕K2(b),K5
2) t0 := ENCKa(a) ˄ ENCKb⊕K2(b)
3) ENCKf (a˄b) := t0 ⊕ ENCK7'(t4) ⊕ (K5 ˄ K6) ⊕ K8'
Helper Holds ENCKa(a),K2,ENCK6(Ka), Kb,K5, ENCK5(Kb⊕K2) 
2) Choose random K7'
3) t1 := ENCKa(a) ˄ (Kb ⊕ K2)
4) ENCK7'(t4) := t1 ⊕  (ENCK6(Ka) ˄ (Kb⊕K2))  ⊕ K7'
5) ENCK7'(t4)
Holds: ENCKb⊕K2(b), ENCK6(Ka), K6
1) Choose random K8' 
2) t2 := Ka ˄ ENCKb⊕K2(b)
4) t3 := K6 ˄ ENCK5(Kb ⊕ K2)    
5) Kf := t2 ⊕ t3 ⊕ K7 ⊕ K8'
3) K8
5) K7'
Figure 4: Algorithm for an AND (∧) operation of two bits a,b reusing priorly shared values with the helper.
Encrypted 
value 
holder
Keyholder
Holds K2, K6, ENCKb⊕K2(b)
4) ENCKb'⊕K2(b) = ENCKb'(b) ⊕ K2
5   := ENCKa(a) ˄ ENCKb'⊕K2(b)
7) ENCKf (a˄b)   ⊕ ENCK7'(t4) ⊕ (K5 ˄ K6) ⊕ K8'
Helper Holds ENCKa(a),K2,ENCK6(Ka), Kb,K5 
3) Choose random K7'
4) t1 := ENCKa(a) ˄ (Kb' ⊕ K2)
5) ENCK7(t4) := t1 ⊕  (ENCK6(Ka) ˄ (Kb⊕K2))  ⊕ K7'
6) ENCK7'(t4)
Holds ENCKb⊕K2(b), ENCK6(Ka), K6, ENCK5(Kb'⊕K2)
1) Choose random Kb',K8' 
2) ENCKb'⊕K2(b) = Kb'⊕Kb⊕ENCKb⊕K2(b)
4) t2 := Ka ˄ ENCKb'⊕K2(b)
    ENCK5(Kb'⊕K2) = Kb'⊕Kb⊕ENCK5(Kb⊕K2)
5) t3 := K6 ˄ ENCK5(Kb' ⊕ K2)    
7) Kf := t2 ⊕ t3 ⊕ K7' ⊕ K8'
3) ENCKb'(Kb),K8'
3) Kb'
6) K7'
Figure 5: Algorithm for an AND (∧) operation of two bits a,b, reusing values for variable a and re-encrypting variable
b.
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EVH additionaly obtains the encrypted key ENCK′b
(Kb)
and K′8 but no information about K
′
b. The helper obtains
K′b, but not ENCK′b
(Kb). The KH obtains K
′
7 and K
′
8.
Theorem 7. For v variables computing t(v) ∈ [v,v2/2]
pairs, needs at most 1+ 4 · v/t(v) bits in total.
Proof. The protocol in Figure 3 needs 5 bits to be commu-
nicated to compute an AND of two bits due to Theorem
5. The protocol in Figure 5 needs 2 bits using pre-shared
keys, i.e. ENCK7′(t4) and ENCK′b
(Kb). The protocol in
Figure 4 needs 1 bit, ENCK7′(t4). We need at most two
encryptions for each variable. Sharing all parts of an en-
cryption needs two bits at most, yielding 4v for sharing.
Thus, to compute t(v) terms, we need just one bit per term
to return the result, giving a total of 4 · v+ t(v) bits.
7.2 Exponential Functions
We show how to compute the exponential function in the
three party case ensuring statistical security. We assume
that a secret a is encrypted using additive blending with-
out modulo of a random key K, i.e. ENCK(a) = a+K.
Our protocol computes ca for a public constant c and
a confidential value a. The protocol relies on the well
known identity ca+b = ca · cb. The EVH shares a ran-
dom key K1 with the KH. It computes ENCK1(c
a+K) =
cENCK (a) +K1 and transmits this to the Helper. The KH
computes K3 := −K1/c
K − K2 and transmits K3 to the
Helper. The Helper receives K, K3, ENCK1(c
a+K). It
chooses a key K2 and shares the key with the KH. It com-
putes ENCK1(c
a+K)/cK − K3 = c
a + K2 = ENCK2(e
a),
which is shared with the EVH.
7.3 Arbitrary Fan-in
We can compute a0 ∧ a1 ∧ . . .∧ aw−1 using two rounds
only. Similarly as for two variables, the AND of multiple
variables can be expressed using multiple terms such that
each term consists of ANDs of multiple encrypted values
and multiple keys. The EVH can compute the AND of
all encrypted values locally, and the KH can do the same
for the keys. Thereby, reducing each term to one partial
result held by the KH and one by EVH. These two partial
results can then be ANDed using the prior protocol for
two variables, yielding the AND of one term. The results
of all terms are XORed.
Theorem 8. A gate a0∧a1∧ . . .∧aw−1 can be evaluated
in 2 rounds using messages of size O(2w) for an arbitrary
parameter k ∈ [2,w] and O(w2w) bit operations.
Proof. We can express the AND using 2w terms by gener-
alizing Equation (1). Let Sw be all subsets of {0,1, ...,w−
1}. We have
a0∧a1∧ . . .∧aw−1
=(a0⊕K0⊕K0)∧a1∧ . . .∧aw−1
=(ENCK0(a0)∧a1∧ . . .∧aw−1)⊕ (K0∧a1∧ . . .∧aw−1)
=(ENCK0(a0)∧ (a1⊕K1⊕K1)∧ . . .∧aw−1)
⊕ (K0∧a1∧ . . .∧aw−1)
=(ENCK0(a0)∧ENCK1(a1)∧ . . .∧aw−1)
⊕ (ENCK0(a0)∧K1∧ . . .∧aw−1)
⊕ (K0∧a1∧ . . .∧aw−1)
=(ENCK0(a0)∧ (ENCK1(a1))∧ . . .∧aw−1)
⊕ (ENCK0(a0)∧K1∧ . . .∧aw−1)
⊕ (K0∧ (a1⊕K1⊕K1)∧ . . .∧aw−1)
=(ENCK0(a0)∧ENCK1(a1)∧ . . .∧aw−1)
⊕ (ENCK0(a0)∧K1∧ . . .∧aw−1)
⊕ (K0∧ENCK1(a1)∧ . . .∧aw−1)
⊕ (K0∧K1∧ . . .∧aw−1)
=⊕SE∈Sw ((∧ j∈SEENCK j (a j))∧ (∧ j∈{0,1,...,w−1}\SEK j))
(5)
In the last step we applied to all ai the same transforma-
tion as for a0 and a1, i.e. replacing ai by ai ⊕Ki ⊕Ki
followed by an expansion of terms. We rearranged using
the commutative property of the AND operation. It can
easily seen that each of the w variables doubles the num-
ber of terms, yielding 2w terms, i.e. each corresponding
to one of the subsets Sw.
In Equation (5) each term ti consists of ANDed val-
ues. It can be partitioned into two parts, one consisting
of encrypted values tE and one of keys tK , e.g. for t =
ENCK0(a0)∧ENCK1 (a1)∧K2 we get tE = ENCK0(a0)∧
ENCK1(a1) and tK = K2. The EVH can compute the term
tE by computing the AND of all encrypted values with-
out communication and the KH the term tK in the same
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manner. The EVH encrypts the locally computed term tE
and the KH encrypts tK , i.e. the EVH chooses key KtE ,
computes ENCKtE (tE) and sends the key KtE to KH. The
KH chooses KtK , computes ENCKtK (tK) and sends the en-
crypted value ENCKtK (tK) to the EVH. Then they run the
protocol (Figure 3) to AND the two terms tE ∧ tK . They
do this for all 2w terms in parallel. Finally, the EVH com-
putes the XOR of all encrypted results for all 2w terms and
the KH computes the XOR of all keys, which yields the
final result for each party.
8 Related Work
Helpers are not uncommon in MPC, e.g. [11, 16]. But
they are often used as trusted entities. In this work, we
do not trust the helper more than any other party. In the
setting of [16] a client wants to know if a value held by
the party matches her secret string. A helper assists in
answering the query. The result of the query should also
remain secret to the party. Generation of RSA keys is
discussed in [11] using a helper. The helper is used to
compute the product of primes using an interpolation of
a quadratic polynomial. We integrate a helper on a much
lower level of computation and adjust basic protocols like
AND and XOR to use a helper.
Though a large body of work [20, 5, 1, 4, 8, 9] does
not distinguish between encrypted values and keys, the
idea of drawing such a separation has been employed in
other contexts, eg. in the work of [10] discussing MPC
the idea of using such a separation with public keys for
voting schemes is mentioned.
Three parties are commonly used, e.g. [26, 9, 23].
The work [26] builds upon garbled circuits, essentially
showing that garbled circuits can be made robust against
corruption of one party. Sharemind [9] uses three parties
and additive secret sharing, i.e. for a secret x each party
Pi obtains a share xi such that ∑xi mod 2
32 = x. To
perform a multiplication they compute all 6 shares xi · x j
using [16]. A multiplication requires 3 rounds and 27
messages each containing a 32-bit value. The paper [9]
also discusses why Shamir’s secret sharing fails on the
ring of 232 (and needs more messages on the ring Zp).
The work [16] also uses an untrusted third party, which
assists in the computation of approximate distances (e.g.
of strings) using various metrics. The system of [23] uses
three parties and linear secret sharing to compute all nine
shares for evaluation of multiplication as [9]. Recently, a
new three party protocol[1] was introduced. In contrast
to this work (and similar to other works, e.g., [9, 25]),
each party obtains a share using linear secret sharing.
The protocol creates correlated randomness among all
three parties. We use correlated randomness for pairs of
parties. They do not require a round for secret sharing
as we do, but assuming that each variable appears on
average (somewhat) more than 10 times in a circuit, their
protocol [1] requires more communication to evaluate
the circuit. In particular, if the number of terms t(v) is
more than linear as the number of variables, we need only
2+o(1) bits per gate and thus outperform by a factor of 3.
An unbounded fan-in AND gate can be simulated [4]
in (expected) constant number of rounds for arithmetic
gates. They encrypt a number ai held by party i as
ENC(ai) = Ri ·ai ·R
−1
i−1 with Ri being a matrix of random
elements. The product of all terms ai is one element in
the matrix being the product of all encryptions. To gener-
ate matrices of sufficient rank, they generate more than
n2 random matrices. We do not use multiplicative in-
verses in a group. We follow a different approach based
on term expansions. Bar-Ilan et al. [4] requires mes-
sages that are of size proportional to the size of a constant
depth, unbounded fan-in circuit for the function to eval-
uate. Our scheme (JOS) requires asymptotically also a
constant number of rounds for computation of a w fan-in
gate but more communication for large w. For the three
party case, JOS outperforms [4] for small fan-in gates.
For example, for w = 4 Bar-Ilan et al. requires at least
6 rounds (using k = 3), whereas JOS needs at most five.
The total amount of communication of [4] is at least 129 · l
in contrast to 60 · l of our scheme. Furthermore, it needs
more local computation.
The BenOr-Goldwasser-Wigderson (BGW) [8, 2] gives
several fundamental MPC protocols. Genaro-Rabin-
Rabin (GRR) [18] simplifies BGW. GRR requires n ≥
2 · t+1≥ 3 parties tolerating collusion of t parties, BGW
can handle collusion of t < n/3 parties in the distrust all
model. GRR and BGW use Shamir’s secret sharing to
derive a protocol for multiplication. The multiplication
protocol Simple-Mult in GRR takes two secrets α and β
shared by two polynomials fα(x) and fβ(x) to compute
α ·β. Party i computes the value fα(i) · fβ(i) using a ran-
11
dom polynomial. Then each party aggregates the input
of other parties and reduces the size of the polynomial
through interpolation to compute his share of α ·β.A pro-
tocol for multiplication and addition using similar ideas
as GRR but using additive secret sharing (without mod-
ulo) is given in [25]. In the case of three parties a se-
cret a is split into three parts a0,a1,a2 such that the sum
equals a. In [25] each party gets two distinct parts. Mul-
tiplication of two secrets a and b is analogous to GRR by
computing all nine pairs ai · b j, aggregating them locally
and sharing the result using independent randomness. A
party then aggregates all received numbers to obtain the
result a · b. To compute (a · b) · c each party would send
its share of a · b to one other party, such that each party
again holds two shares of the result. A key disadvantage
of [25] is that shares double in size after every multipli-
cation, making it impractical for even a modest number
of multiplications. The paper by Yao [29] from the late
80ies still forms the underpinning for many works evalu-
ating Boolean circuits. Yao showed how one party A can
evaluate a private boolean circuit with private inputs from
itself and another party B such that A does not learn any-
thing about the inputs of B and B does not learn anything
about the circuit or the input of A. To do so A computes
a so called “garbled circuit” which is an encryption of the
circuit containing the input. Afterwards, party B evalu-
ates the encrypted circuit using its input and returns the
result. Encryption encompasses encrypting every entry of
the truth table of the boolean circuit and uses several algo-
rithmic ideas such as oblivious transfer of keys to do the
two party computation. The original scheme [29] allowed
for a circuit only to be evaluated once without revealing
information about the circuit. Since then a lot of improve-
ments have been made, e.g., [17, 19, 7]. Reusable circuits
come only with additive overhead in the form of a polyno-
mial in the security parameter and circuit depth [19]. Our
advantage compared to [19] is that we ensure perfect se-
curity and encryption is much simpler (and faster). Addi-
tionally, our communication complexity does not depend
on a polynomial depending on the security parameter as
well as the circuit depth, which can easily dominate the
communication costs. Yao’s scheme has been generalized
to multiple parties by computing a common garbled cir-
cuit in BMR [5]. Several evaluations are possible using
multilinear jigsaw puzzles [17]. A circuit can be garbled
such that its encryption occurs only additional overhead
[19]. Recent implemenations[7] allow for a single AES
call per garbled-gate (justified in the random-permutation
model). Goldreich-Micali-Widgerson (GMW) [20] uses
oblivious transfer to compute any Boolean circuit. Val-
ues are encrypted such that each party holds parts of the
non-encrypted value. The GMW protocol has round com-
plexity linear in the depth of the circuit. Oblivious transfer
has been continuously optimized, e.g. [3] uses symmet-
ric cryptography. Still, using [3] for an oblivious transfer
requires (as a lower bound) at least the size of the secu-
rity parameter, which is significantly more than our total
communication for an AND.
A significant body of work has focused on optimizing
either the computational or communication overhead (e.g.
[13, 15, 14, 21]) of MPC focusing on entire circuits for
various security models using known schemes for evaluat-
ing gates. We focus on optimizing elementary operations
for a single gate for perfect security that can be used to
compute entire circuits. There is a vast number of secret
sharing schemes, e.g. for a survey see [6]. Our linear en-
cryption schemes are known. For instance, [22] encrypts
a secret using XOR. Additive encryption as done in JOS
roughly corresponds to [8] and has been also employed by
[12]. Whereas prior work shared a secret with all parties,
we use a dedicated helper to support computation and use
the properties of the encryption schemes to derive novel
protocols.
The first work attempting to compute exponential func-
tions in a constant number of rounds was [24]. The model
of [24] assumes that each party has a secret. Although
they claim that an adversary can corrupt two parties for
all their protocols, in fact, information about a secret (of
one party) is revealed if one party behaves dishonestly.
To see this consider, e.g. the protocol 3.1 for multiplica-
tion in [24]. They compute u1+ u2 = x1 · x2 using a non-
specified algorithm, where x1,x2 are secrets, ui are secret
shares and ui,xi are held by party i. If an attacker corrupts
parties 1 and 2 and obtains u1 and u2 it also obtains x1 ·x2.
Clearly, revealing x1 · x2 is a violation of confidentiality
for both x1 and x2. Furthermore, they require a two-party
protocol (as blackbox) for real numbers to get u1,u2 such
that u1+ u2 = x1 · x2 but do not state any efficient proto-
col. This work is an extension of [27] with more detailed
model discusion, proofs, computation of the exponential
function, a protocol for reusing values and a protocol for
achieving a trade-off between round and communication
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complexity for large fan-in gates. Prior work [28] based
on [27] has shown how to compute various logical and
numerical functions, e.g. trigonometric functions and di-
visions, as well as transformations between different en-
cryption schemes.
9 Conclusions
We have assessed the idea of using one party as a helper
in the context of secure-multi party computation. The
derived protocols achieve little communication, storage,
and computational overhead. In some cases, they are the-
oretically optimal regarding communication complexity,
showing that a helper can be of great value from a the-
oretical perspective. Numerical computations relying on
statistical security can in some cases also largely benefit
from a helper.
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